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RÉSUMÉ
Cette étude propose un modèle d'exploitation des ressources naturelles lorsque les
droits de propriété sont onéreux à faire respecter. Il y est démontré comment, sur un site
de ressources naturelles, une hausse du produit moyen de la main-d'œuvre peut
contribuer à faire augmenter les coûts d'exclusion d'empiéteurs potentiels; il ne serait donc
pas optimal, pour le propriétaire du site, d'exploiter à un niveau tel que le produit marginal
de la main-d'œuvre soit égal à son coût. Il serait même admissible que le propriétaire
engage de la main-d'œuvre dont le produit marginal soit négatif. Le niveau de salaire
constitue un paramètre important de l'analyse. On trouve que lorsque le niveau de salaire
de l'économie est déjà peu élevé, des réductions de salaire subséquentes peuvent
contribuer à réduire les rentes découlant de l'exploitation du site. Et en deçà d'un certain
seuil, des rentes positives deviennent inatteignables, forçant son propriétaire à
abandonner le site; ce dernier devient alors soumis à un accès libre. L'analyse expliquerait
le fait que les droits de propriété soient plus difficiles à faire observer dans les pays en
voie de développement. De plus, elle suggère un cadre d'analyse à partir duquel certaines
questions d'ordre normatif pourraient être abordées, telles que les bienfaits du commerce
international avec coûts endogènes des droits de propriété, l'optimalité des décisions de
définir les droits de propriété, l'effet de la distribution des revenus sur les coûts
d'application des droits de propriété, etc.
Mots clés : droits de propriété, coûts d'exclusion, ressources naturelles, niveaux de
revenus, économie du développement, économie du crime, travail illicite
ABSTRACT
This paper proposes a model of natural-resource exploitation when private
ownership requires costly enforcement activities. For a given wage rate, it is shown how
enforcement costs can increase with labor's average productivity on a resource site. As a
result, it is never optimal for the site owner to produce at the point where marginal
productivity equals the wage rate. It may even be optimal to exploit at a point exhibiting
negative marginal returns. An important parameter in the analysis is the prevailing wage
rate. When wages are low, further decreases in the wage rates can reduce the returns
from resource exploitation. At sufficiently low wages, positive returns can be rendered
impossible to achieve and the site is abandoned to a free-access exploitation. The
analysis provides some clues as to why property rights may be more difficult to delineate
in less developed countries. It proposes a different framework from which to address
normative issues such as the desirability of free trade with endogenous enforcement
costs, the optimality of private decisions to enforce property rights, the effect of income
distribution on property rights enforceability, etc.
Key words : property rights, enforcement costs, natural resources, income levels,
economic development, economics of crime, illegal labor
Le premier qui ayant enclos un terrain, s'avisa de dire, Ceci est a moi, et trouva des gens
asses simples pour le croire, fut le vrai fondateur de la societe civile. Que de crimes, de guerres,
de meurtres, que de miseres et d'horreurs, n'eu^t point epargnes au Genre-humain celui qui
arrachant les pieux ou comblant le fosse, eu^t crie a ses semblables. Gardez-vous d'ecouter cet imposteur;
vous e^tes perdus, si vous oubliez que les fruits sont a tous, et que la terre n'est a personne.
Jean Jaques Rousseau (1754), Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inegalite parmi les hommes
Quoy celui qui a plante, seme et enclos na pas droit au fruit de ses peines.
Voltaire's reaction (175?), cited in Havens (1966)
1 Introduction
Ill-dened property rights are often cited as a major cause underlying the inecient exploitation
of natural resources. Although present in both industrialized and less developed countries, the
problem seems to be more accute in the latter
1
. This begs the question not only as to why property
rights may be decient on some natural resource sites
2
, but also as to why it seems more dicult
to protect those rights in less developed economies.
Observing that property rights are not as well dened in less developed countries, a few theoret-
ical inquiries have considered the eects of trade between industrialized regions with well dened
property rights and less industrialized regions with decient property rights (see, e.g., Chichilnisky
1994; Brander and Taylor [1995, 1996]; Tornell and Velasco 1992). These studies take tenure regimes
in both regions as exogenous to the analysis. In this respect, a more fundamental issue is being
sidesteped which may aect some of their conclusions about the eects of trade: they do not account
for the causes of the dierent prevailing tenure regimes.
Another branch of the literature on property rights oers various reasons explaining the dif-
ferent tenure regimes in eect accross regions or periods. Some authors contend that it may be
1
World Bank (1992, Chapter 3).
2
For the present purpose, the expression natural resource site is meant to apply mostly to renewable resources
such as inshore sheries, pasture lands, forests, irrigation systems, hunting territories, etc., evolving in a steady-state
(see Gordon (1954) for instance). I therefore abstract from any dynamic considerations such as the nonrenewability
of a resource or out of steady-state behavior.
1
related to a society's culture, religion, legal institutions, etc. (North 1990; Cohen and Weitzman
1975; Firmin-Sellers 1995). Others have suggested that securing those rights be the result of a
cost-benet analysis on the part of the private owner. If there are costs associated with property
enclosure, ownership will be claimed only as long as benets from exploitation exceed enclosure
costs. Anderson and Hill (1975) advocate such economic incentives underlying the determination
of property rights. In their formulation, enclosure movements are mostly driven by exogenous tech-
nological progress in enforcement technology and by changes in output prices. Within the context
of an open international economy, their analysis, however, can hardly account for the dierences
in property rights regimes observed between industrialized and less developed economies. Field's
(1989) approach gets closer to providing an explanation by observing that an increase in population
can lead to a reduction in exclusion costs through the increased supply of labor. Unfortunately,
he does not provide us with a complete analytical framework. What is needed, therefore, is a the-
oretical framework which, based on economic incentives, provides clues as to why it seems more
dicult to claim ownership over natural resource sites in less developed countries. The present
study proposes one.
As mentioned above, one of the principal impediments for the delineation of property rights
resides in the often too large costs of enforcement. An individual who holds a title to a resource
site must decide whether to engage in costly enforcement activities in order to exclude potential
encroachers. This analysis attempts to determine which factors may aect these costs.
Accepting that well dened property rights require the costly activity of excluding encroachers,
one can assume that the higher the incentives to encroach, the costlier it is to exclude. My analysis
borrows from the literature on the economics of crime and the supply of illegal labor in order to
pin down an individual's incentives to encroach. This leads to the determination of an enforcement
cost function for a resource site, according to which enforcement costs are positively related to the
value of average product of labor on the site, but negatively related to the prevailing legal wage
rate in the economy.
The proposed enforcement cost function enters the prot function of the holder of the title
2
to a site. I show that under reasonable assumptions regarding the functional forms of both the
production and detection functions, rents from a resource site exploitation may actually decrease
following a reduction in the legal wage rate. Moreover, there exists a positive threshold level of
the wage rate for which further reductions in its value make it prohibitively expensive to protect
one's property from encroachment. This suggests a strictly economic rationale for the lack of well
dened property rights observed in low income or pre-industrial economies, which diers from other
oft-mentioned non-economic factors such as dierences in technology, culture, legal institutions, etc.
The model also allows us to verify Demsetz's (1967) conjecture which states that an increase in
resource value is likely to lead to better delineated property rights.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 determines the general shape and arguments of an
enforcement cost function for the denition of property rights on a natural resource site; partial
equilibrium exploitation decisions for a prot maximizing resource site owner are then derived. The
eects of varying the legal wage rate on the prot function are presented in Section 3. In Section
4, I consider the eects of increasing the resource price on the delineation of property rights. The
conclusion presents a discussion of the results and proposes some extensions.
2 The Model
In this section, a model will be developed which leads to an enforcement cost function for the
delineation of property rights over the exploitation of a resource site. In order for property rights
over a resource site to be well dened, it must be the case that the holder of those rights, the
owner, receive all the benets from its exploitation and bear all the costs. These costs take the
form of direct exploitation costs, but must also include the costs involved in enforcing property
rights, i.e. ensuring that no one will encroach on the property. It must be emphasized that the
fact that nobody encroaches on the property does not imply that enforcement activities are absent;
to the contrary, it implies that these activities are important enough to completely discourage any
desire to encroach. I do not exclude, however, the possibility of partially dened property rights, in
3
which case the owner could consider that it is in her own best interest, given the costs of excluding
encroachers, to let a certain amount of the site's output be captured by encroachers. We will
see below, however, that in the proposed model, a prot maximizing site owner will never opt to
partially dene her property rights
3
; she either completely eliminates all incentives to encroach or,
if enforcement costs are too large, she abandons the site to a free access exploitation. Note that in
this last case, the institution of private property will not be sucient to prevent free access from
occuring in equilibrium. Moreover, private decisions to have well dened property rights may not
be a socially ecient outcome as there are now costs involved in dening property rights
4
.
Consider now the following model of natural resource exploitation with costly enforcement of
property rights. Assume a community inhabited by a total of N workers and a certain number of
owners, which may comprise natural resource site owners as well as any other type of productive
capital ownership. All workers receive a legal wage from a job they hold in the ocial or legitimate
sector, which includes employment by a resource site owner who hires workers and pays them the
going wage rate. Workers must, however, allocate their spare time after ocial working hours,
between leisure and illegal activities
5
. The latter takes the form of encroachment over a resource
site. Workers are assumed to be consumers as well, thus facing a trade-o between consumption
levels and leisure time.
Of interest to us is the behavior of the owner who holds a title to a resource site. In order to
maximize returns from the site, she must decide on how many workers to hire at the going legal
wage rate for the direct exploitation of the resource, and on how much enforcement activities to
undertake in order to discourage encroachment. This includes relinquishing the site to a free access
exploitation where no enforcement activities take place.
In order to concentrate on the problem faced by the owner of a site, let us consider a partial
3
Instances of partial enforcement appear in Helsley and Strange (1994), Milliman (1986), Sutinen and Anderson
(1985) and Clarke et al. (1993). Tietenberg (1996, p. 293) provides a short interpretation.
4
On the eciency of private decisions to enforce property rights, see Anderson and Hill (1975), de Meza and
Gould (1992), Lasserre (1994) and Field (1989).
5
See Ehrlich (1973), p. 528, for a discussion of the choice between taking part in both legitimate and illegitimate
activities or specializing in one type of activity.
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equilibrium setting in which both the wage rate and the resource price are exogenously determined.
The owner and encroachers engage in a sequential game where the owner rst chooses the amount of
workers, L, to hire on the site and the amount of enforcement expenditures, x, devoted to containing
encroachment. In making these choices, she anticipates the encroachers' reaction to them. As will be
described below in more details, the amount of enforcement expenditures can reduce encroachment
activities by increasing the probability of detecting an encroacher on the site, denoted by (x).
Each worker constitutes a potential encroacher and they all simultaneously choose the amount of
time to spend encroaching, h
i
, i = 1; :::; N , after having observed L and x. Note that the workers
hired by the site owner are part of the N encroachers but that encroachment activities can only
occur after ocial working hours. All N workers/encroachers are thus identical in that each receives
a legal wage, w, prior to deciding on encroachment activities. Note also that due to the assumed
large number of potential encroachers, it is considered prohibitively costly for the owner to contract
with every single one of them.
Since the owner is the rst mover, let us begin by rst deriving the encroachers' reaction to the
choices of L and x.
2.1 The decision to encroach
Workers face a trade-o between consumption levels and leisure time. Borrowing from the literature
on the supply of illegal or unocial labor
6
, let us assume that a worker derives utility from both
consumption of goods, c, and leisure time, T , h, where T is the total amount of leisure time
available after ocial working hours, and h denotes time spent on illegal activities. The following
simple representation of utility will be used
7
:
U(c; h) = c (1 , h); (1)
6
For a review and some references, see Cowell (1990, chapter 5).
7
Schmidt and Witte (1984, Appendix 9.2) provide a good discussion of the assumptions on a utility function using
leisure and consumption as its arguments.
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where T has been normalized to one. Recall that all workers are assumed to be active within the
ocial sector; the only choice variable resides in the amount of time, 0  h  1, spent on illegal
activities after legal working hours. The utility function implies that workers are risk-neutral as
far as their consumption levels are concerned
8
and that higher consumption levels increase the
opportunity cost of leisure time.
The period of inelastically supplied legal work being normalized to one, legal work brings in a
wage w with certainty for that period. Illegal work, which takes the form of encroachment over a
resource site, involves an element of uncertainty regarding its return. This is due to the fact that
an encroacher, if detected, will be punished. For simplicity, I will assume that punishment carries a
monetary value equivalent to a ne which conscates all illegal income, and that the probability of
being detected depends solely on the decision to encroach, regardless of the amount of time spent
encroaching. Hence, if the probability of being detected is given by (x), consumption will be equal
to c
0
= w with probability (x) and to c
1
= w+hw
il
with probability 1,(x), where w
il
represents
the return from illegal activities
9
. It is natural to assume that w
il
is equal to the value of average
product (V AP ) of labor time on the site
10
. The encroachment problem proposed here is in many
respects similar to the problem of free access exploitation developed in Dasgupta and Heal (1979),
the main dierences being that the opportunity cost of exploiting the resource for the encroacher
is given by the value of his leisure time and that the encroacher must face a probability of being
8
See Block and Heineke (1973) and Cowell (1981) on the supply of labor under income uncertainty.
9
See Becker (1968), Ehrlich (1973), and Heineke (1978) for similar representations of an individual's decisions
to participate in illegitimate activities when there is a probability of apprehension and punishment. In the present
model, punishment takes the general form of a proportional ne, f = hw
il
, with  = 1 for simplicity. Any other
factor of proportionality would preserve the essence of the results. Lump-sum and innitely large nes are ruled out;
they are believed to be either inecient or socially unacceptable. See, for instance, Stigler (1970), Friedman and
Sjostrom (1993) and Van Rijckeghem and Weder (1997) on the magnitudes of nes.
10
Productivity dierences due to investments or better technology by the owner are assumed away. See Besley
(1995) for theory and evidence on property rights and investment incentives.
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ned if detected. The function (x) will be assumed to satisfy the following properties
11
:

0
(x) > 0; 
00
(x) < 0; (0) = 0; lim
x!1
(x) = 1; lim
x!1

0
(x) = 0; x  0: (2)
Let R(H) be the total output function for the resource site, where H denotes the total amount
of labor time exploiting the site, i.e. H = L +
P
N
i=1
h
i
. Hence, V AP = V AP (H) = pR(H)=H,
where p is the resource price in units of consumption goods. I will assume that V AP
0
(H) < 0 and
that there exists 0 <

H < 1 such that V AP (

H) = 0. Having observed the choice of L and x by
the owner of the site, the jth encroacher will maximize his expected utility by choosing h
j
, taking
as given h
i
, i 6= j, in order to solve the following problem:
max
h
j
E[U ] = (1, (x))
"
w + h
j
V AP (L+
X
i6=j
h
i
+ h
j
)
#
(1 , h
j
) + (x)w(1 , h
j
): (3)
The equilibrium decisions of the encroachers must therefore satisfy, for an interior solution, the
following set of rst-order conditions for j = 1; :::; N :
(1, h

j
)(1, (x))[V AP (H) + h

j
V AP
0
(H)] = w + (1 , (x))h

j
V AP (H): (4)
The right-hand side of the above relation gives the loss in expected utility due to a marginal
reduction in leisure time, i.e. it represents the opportunity cost of leisure time. The left-hand side
represents the net gain in expected utility resulting from the change in income. In equilibrium, of
course, the marginal gain must equal the marginal loss. Rearranging equation (4), we get
12
,
(1, (x))[(1, 2h

j
)V AP (H) + (1 , h

j
)h

j
V AP
0
(H)] = w: (5)
11
The analysis does not consider the issue of third party enforcement (North 1990, Chapter 7). Once an encroacher
has been reported to the authorities by a site owner, he is automatically punished and the amount of the ne goes
to the treasury.
12
Note that the rst-order conditions imply: @h

j
=@w < 0, @h

j
=@ < 0 and, beyond a certain value of N ,
@h

j
=@L < 0. These comparative statics results are consistent with empirical investigations on income-generating
illegal activities which state that (Heineke 1978): an increase in the probability of being detected, or in the going
wage rate, reduces the individual supply of illegal labor; conversely, a larger return to illegal work, which in this case
is equivalent to a reduction in L, has the opposite eect. See also Ehrlich (1973) on this.
7
Note that since V AP (H)  0 and V AP
0
(H) < 0, we must have h

j
< 1=2 in order for the rst-order
condition to hold. A symmetrical equilibrium, where h

i
= h

, for all i = 1; :::; N , will satisfy:
(1, (x))[(1, 2h

)V AP (L+Nh

) + (1 , h

)h

V AP
0
(L+Nh

)] = w: (6)
Following Dasgupta and Heal (1979, p. 61), consider now the limiting case where N tends to
innity. It can be veried from (6) that there exists a certain

N  1 beyond which h

is monotone
decreasing in N
13
. Suppose then that h

were to tend to some strictly positive value as N goes to
innity. This would mean that Nh

becomes innitely large and therefore V AP (L + Nh

) = 0.
The left-hand side of (6) would then be strictly negative and the rst-order condition could not
hold. As a result, it must be the case that as N tends to innity, Nh

remains nite and h

goes
to zero. The rst-order condition is thus, for suciently large N :
(1, (x))V AP (L+Nh

) = w: (7)
In other words, as N becomes suciently large, h

becomes innitesimally small, with the result
that the opportunity cost of leisure time becomes simply equal to w and the expected utility gain
from a marginal increase in encroachment time becomes (1, (x))V AP (L+Nh

). Note that the
fact that h

is small does not imply that encroachment is not a signicant problem for the owner.
This is because N is large so that Nh

could be large. It should be noted also that the model
replicates Gordon's (1954) result that for a free access resource, i.e. one where (x) = 0 and L = 0,
we get V AP (Nh

) = w, i.e. taking into account the opportunity cost of labor, all rents from the
site are exhausted when N is suciently large
14
.
Equation (7) determines how much encroachment Nh

will occur for any choice of L and x by
the owner. It is the implicit reaction function of the encroachers that the site owner will take as
given in making her decisions.
13
It can also be veried that the symmetrical equilibrium is unique and stable. (Varian 1992, p. 287)
14
The conditions that justify the assumption of period-by-period rent dissipation for a free access commonproperty,
as in Gordon (1954), are laid out in Brooks et al. (1996).
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2.2 The decision to exploit and enforce a site
The owner wishes to choose the amount of labor to employ, L, and the amount of enforcement
activities or expenditures
15
, x, in order to maximize prots,
max
x;L
 = V AP (L+Nh

)L ,wL , x; (8)
where Nh

is given implicitly by equation (7). The rst-order conditions for this problem are:
@
@L
= V AP (L+Nh

), w + V AP
0
(L+Nh

)

1 +
@(Nh

)
@L

= 0; (9)
@
@x
= ,1 + V AP
0
(L+Nh

)
@(Nh

)
@x
= 0: (10)
Notice that since h
i
cannot be negative, Nh

is bounded from below by zero. Hence, from (7),
we get @(Nh

)=@L = ,1 when Nh

> 0, and @(Nh

)=@L = 0 when Nh

= 0. But since positive
prots imply that V AP ,w > 0, @=@L is strictly positive when Nh

> 0 and  > 0. As a result,
for any given x, L must be such that Nh

= 0 in equilibrium. In other words, if Nh

> 0 and prots
are positive, prots can be increased by increasing L. Notice also that once Nh

is equal to zero,
further increases in L cannot be oset by reductions in Nh

. Therefore, for given x, V AP starts
decreasing with increases in L and we get (1 , (x))V AP (L) < w, i.e. the expected utility gain
from encroaching becomes strictly smaller than its cost. But this cannot be a prot maximizing
equilibrium since x could be reduced until the equality is reestablished, resulting in an increase in
prots. Let us denote by E the level of enforcement expenditures that minimizes enforcement costs,
while respecting equation (7) with Nh

= 0. Therefore, E is given by (E) = 1 , w=V AP (L), or
15
In practice, enforcement activities can take the form of direct supervision time by the owner, hired guards which
may be paid a preferential wage in order to \buy" their honesty, and some material expenditures.
9
implicitly by
16
E = E

1,
w
V AP (L)

; (11)
with E
0
> 0, E
00
> 0, E = 0 when w = V AP (L), and lim
V AP!1
E = lim
w!0
E = +1. These
properties for E() are derived from the properties of (x) assumed in (2).
Equation (11) denes the implicit relation that must prevail in equilibrium between enforcement
expenditures, E, and the value of average product of labor, which itself depends on the quantity
L of labor hired on the site. This relation will be referred to as the enforcement cost function
associated with a privately held natural resource site. This function can now be inserted into the
prot function of the owner in order to analyse its impact on exploitation levels and private decisions
to secure property rights. For an exogenous resource price, p, and wage rate, w, the prot derived
by an owner from a site on which property rights are fully protected from encroachment are now:
 = pR(L) , wL, E; (12)
where E = E(1 , w=V AP (L)). Notice how the choice of labor not only aects the direct returns
from exploitation, pR(L) , wL, but also indirectly aects enforcement costs through its eect on
V AP (L). Both values being dependent on the number of workers employed, L constitutes the
owner's sole choice variable.
The rst-order condition for a prot maximizing interior solution is:
R
0
(L

) =
w
p

1 +
E
0
()
V AP
2
@V AP
@L

: (13)
Since @V AP=@L < 0, we have pR
0
(L

) < w. Hence the owner of the site employs labor at a
level for which the value of marginal productivity is lower than the wage rate. Note that this result
16
Note that the detection probability function used here implies that the available technology does not allow for
perfectly enclosed properties. This is in line with Barzel's observation that \fences around orchards are not made
to be totally insurmountable." (Barzel 1989, p. 110). But this does not necessarily imply that one cannot deter all
theft, contrary to Barzel's assertion in the same paragraph. As the present model implies, if thieves are expected
utility maximizing individuals, there will always exist a nite level of protection expenditures which will completely
eliminate any incentives for theft.
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obtains despite the fact that all benets and costs accrue to the owner of the resource, i.e. no
encroachment occurs. Depending on the exact form of the production and enforcement functions, it
could even be optimal, given the wage rate and the resource price, for the owner of a site to employ
labor with negative marginal productivity.
In order to simplify the analysis and illustrate the results, let us assume a quadratic production
function
17
, i.e. R(L) = (A , BL)L, with A;B > 0. Then @V AP=@L = ,pB and equation (13)
becomes:
R
0
(L

) =
w
p

1 , pB
E
0
()
V AP
2

(14)
This result is presented in Figure 1, where subscripts 1 and 2 refer to dierent enforcement and
production functions, thus illustrating two possible cases of resource exploitation. L
F
refers to the
level of exploitation of a free access resource, in which all rents are exhausted, i.e. average product
equals the wage rate
18
.
The intuition behind the above result is as follows: At the point where the value of labor's
marginal productivity equals the wage rate, adding a worker to the exploitation of the resource
increases revenues by the same amount as its direct cost, the wage rate. Enforcement expenditures,
however, can be reduced since the now lower average productivity makes encroachment less attrac-
tive. Therefore, it pays to hire that extra worker. Each further addition to the labor force will yield
less than the wage rate and this, at an increasing rate, as there are decreasing returns to labor;
conversely, if the gains in reduced enforcement costs occur at a constant or diminishing rate, then an
17
Such a functional form is quite common in the study of renewable resources; de Meza and Gould (1992) explicitely
use such a form. Brander and Taylor (1995) implicitely use such a function for a steady-state harvest. Using their
notation, it is straightforward to derive their steady-state harvest function as H
SS
(L
H
) = (K)L
H
  (
2
K=r)L
2
H
,
where K denotes the \carrying capacity" of the resource, r is the \uncongested" growth rate, and  represents a
harvest eciency coecient.
18
See Gordon (1954) for an early technical analysis on the exploitation of open access natural resources, Hardin
(1968) for an intuitive approach on the \Tragedy of the Commons" or Baumol and Oates (1988, pp. 26-28) for
a concise presentation. As mentioned by Ostrom (1990), this theory abstracts from the fact that individuals may
organize to improve the eciency of exploitation of a resource subject to free access. Once a site becomes exploited
by an organized group, it can no longer be referred to as free access property but rather as common property. But
then this group must devote resources to enforce its exploitation rules and exclude others. In this respect, the site
has eectively become enclosed and can be treated as a privately owned site. See also Barzel (1989, p. 71) on this.
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Figure 1: Enforcement costs and equilibrium exploitation of a privately owned resource site
employer will hire more workers until the two eects exactly oset each other. An interior solution
for L

will exist whenever the marginal gain in reduced enforcement costs equals the marginal loss
of increased production at a level below L
F
. If the marginal enforcement gain and production loss
curves do not meet before L
F
is reached, then it will never be optimal for an individual to claim
ownership over the resource. Note that the existence of an interior solution is not sucient for the
resource site to be privatized; an additional condition is that prots be positive at that point.
We therefore observe that if enforcement costs are positively related to a resource site's value of
average productivity of labor, then the level of exploitation will exceed that for which the value of
marginal productivity equals the wage rate, even though no encroachment occurs on the site. It is
interesting to note that in their study of range land exploitation on Southwestern Indian reservations
in the United States, Johnson and Libecap (1980) have observed the use of overgrazing as a means
of discouraging potential entrants. They attribute this suboptimal situation to the authorities'
refusal to grant formal recognition of land ownership to large herders. The emphasis is thus put on
the role of a third party, i.e. the authorities. The foregoing analysis suggests that one should also
consider the role played by private decisions to enforce and by incentives to encroach from other
individuals on the reservation. Note also that the eectiveness of detection activities could depend
on the choice of commodities produced by the owner. This is instanced by Cheung (1970) with the
12
observation that in Tripolitania, more valuable almond production was replaced by cattle raising
because almond trees were more dicult to police than cattle which can be driven home at night.
In the detection function given by Equation 15 below, almond trees would have a higher  than
cattle.
3 The Eect of theWage Rate on the EquilibriumOutcome
The foregoing analysis allows us to perform some comparative static experiments in order to deter-
mine the role played by relevant parameters such as an economy's prevailing wage rate or resource
price. In order to perform comparative static experiments, let us assume that the function (x)
takes the following form:
(x) = 1, e
 x=
(15)
where  is a shift parameter. It is easy to verify that this function has the required properties.
Substituting (x) = (E) = 1 ,w=V AP (L) and inverting the function, we nd that:
E =  ln

V AP (L)
w

: (16)
The prot function can now be expressed as follows:
(L;A;B; ; p; w) = p(A,BL)L,wL ,  ln

p(A,BL)
w

: (17)
Maximizing with respect to L yields the following rst-order conditions for an interior solution:
@
@L
= p(A, 2BL

), w +
 B
A,BL

= 0: (18)
In Appendix A, it is shown that the equilibrium amount of labor is:
L

=
1
4pB
h
(3pA , w),
p
(3pA, w)
2
, 8p[ B +A(pA, w)]
i
: (19)
Equations (17) and (18) allow us to study the eect of w on equilibrium prots. The analysis
suggests that a reduction in the prevailing wage rate of an economy will have two opposite eects
13
on prot levels: the standard one is to increase prots by reducing the wage bill paid to workers;
the other is to reduce prots by indirectly increasing enforcement costs. As shown below, which
eect prevails may depend upon the wage level.
Taking the derivative of prots with respect to w at L

, we have:
@

@w
= ,L

+

w
: (20)
Therefore, on the one hand, a marginal reduction in the wage rate pushes up prots by L

through
a reduction in labor costs; on the other hand, prots are brought down by =w through larger
enforcement costs due to increased incentives to encroach for poorer workers. Note that if  = 0, so
that  = 1, thus eliminating the need for enforcement expenditures, we recover Hotelling's lemma
by removing the right hand side's second term. With the help of Equation (20), the general shape
of the prot function, 

, with respect to the wage rate is derived in Appendix B and illustrated
by Figure 2. The curve labelled 

NE
depicts standard equilibrium prots as a function of w when
enforcement costs are nonexistent, i.e.  = 0.
The largest equilibrium rents occur at w = 2B=A. At w
H
= (1=2)( pA+
p
pA(pA, 2 w) ), we
have 

= 0 and @

=@w = 0. The wage rate is then so high that gross returns from exploitation
are just enough to cover enforcement costs. Further increases in the wage rate make it impossible
to cover enforcement costs and all incentives to establish property rights vanish. Notice that w <
w
H
< pA. As the wage goes down from w
H
, equilibrium prots rst behave in the usual way, i.e.
they are convex and decreasing with w. At high wages, the direct eect on gross returns from
exploitation outweigh the eect on enforcement costs. But as w is further reduced, the function
becomes concave. It reaches a slope of zero at w. At that point, the enforcement eect overtakes
the direct exploitation eect and additional reductions in wages reduce prot levels. At wages
below w
L
, legal incomes are so low that workers' willingness to encroach make enforcement costs
prohibitive. The site is left to open access exploitation. It is shown in Appendix B that w
L
is
strictly positive
19
.
19
Note that the sign of the second derivative of 

(w) between 0 and w has not been determined. For the present
14
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Figure 2: Prots as a function of wage
Note that there are discontinuities at w
L
and w
H
. At wages below w
L
and above w
H
, negative
returns could always be dealt with by employing just enough workers to make the value of average
productivity equal to the wage rate. By (16), this drives enforcement costs to zero. But prots are
also equal to zero. This is essentially equivalent to open access exploitation.
These results regarding the possible behavior of equilibrium prots as the wage rate varies
carry interesting implications for the study of property rights determination and natural resource
exploitation in less developed countries or in the economic history of industrialized countries. It
provides an economic rationale for the lack of well-dened property rights in those economies as
compared to industrialized countries. Figure 2 suggests that for a less developed country with
comparatively low wages, incentives to enclose natural resource properties tend to be weak. For
higher wages closer to w, incentives to enclose properties are more important. It must be stressed
that these conclusions do not rest on any exogenous institutional or cultural dierences. Given
purpose, the important point to make is that within the interval, both the rst derivative and w
L
are strictly positive.
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individuals' latent threat to encroach, economic agents may be making the most ecient decision
by leaving access to some resources open to all. Any added prot resulting from a reduced level of
exploitation would be exceeded by larger enforcement costs at w  w
L
. In this case, distributing
titles to hitherto free access natural resource sites as a means of reducing the intensity of exploitation
would result in wasted energies as the new owners would nd no economic incentives to actually
protect the sites from encroachment.
4 The Eects of an Increase in Resource Value on the De-
lineation of Property Rights
In this section, I propose to verify, within the present context, Demsetz's (1967) conjecture which
holds that an increase in the value of a resource is likely to lead, ceteris paribus, to a better
delineation of property rights. Demsetz illustrates his point by mentioning a study of the Montagnais
Indians in Quebec which \established the fact that a close relationship existed, both historically
and geographically, between the development of private rights in land and the development of the
commercial fur trade." (Demsetz 1967, p. 351). Surmising that the advent of the fur trade resulted
in an increase in the value of furs, the study supports his conjecture. Nevertheless, in his Economic
analysis of property rights, Barzel (1989) points out that Demsetz's conjecture may not always hold.
He does recognize that on the one hand, an increase in the value of a resource leads to a higher
return from delineation. But on the other hand, incentives for theft are also made higher, thus
increasing the costs of policing. There is no a priori reason to believe that the rst eect will prevail
over the second one. As shown below, the present model indicates that within a partial equilibrium
framework, an increase in the value of a resource cannot lead to less well delineated property rights.
I present the proof of this assertion here because it provides us with some insight.
Suppose that at some initial price p
0
and wage rate w, an owner maximizes her prots by choosing
to employ L
0
workers. Assuming positive prots, this site is operated under private ownership. I will
now demonstrate that, ceteris paribus, an increase in the resource price cannot lead to a reduction
16
in equilibrium prots from private ownership; hence, it cannot lead to the abandonment of a site
to free access.
Let the price of the resource increase to p
1
> p
0
, with a constant wage rate. Although it may not
be her prot maximizing choice, the owner could then always choose to employ L
1
workers in order
to satisfy V AP
1
(L
1
) = V AP
0
(L
0
), i.e. such that enforcement costs remain the same. Inserting this
into the prot function (17), we get the following inequality:
[V AP
0
(L
0
), w]L
0
,  ln

V AP
0
(L
0
)
w

< [V AP
1
(L
1
),w]L
1
,  ln

V AP
1
(L
1
)
w

; (21)
since p
1
R(L
1
)=L
1
= p
0
R(L
0
)=L
0
implies L
1
> L
0
when p
1
> p
0
, and V AP
0
> w if initial prots are
to be positive. This completes the demonstration that equilibrium prots cannot decrease following
an increase in resource price.
The intuition behind the above result is that even though the value of the resource has increased,
the owner could always keep enforcement costs the same by reducing the attractiveness of the
resource through an adjustment in the average productivity of labor. In eect, it is as if the new
price structure allowed the owner to replicate the old one by resorting to some form of \destruction
of value".
20
The point is that the initial relative values remain an option at the new higher prices,
but the reverse is not true.
5 Conclusion
In his seminal paper on property rights, Steven Cheung posed the following question: \Why do
exclusive rights not exist for certain actions? Because of the legal institutions, or because policing
20
I surmise that a similar reasoning would apply to the case presented in Barzel (1989, p. 67). Barzel points out
that in a theater with bad and good tickets, it is not possible to say if a doubling in the value of all tickets will lead
to a better delineation in prices. He argues that on the one hand, \the dierence in valuation between a bad and
a good seat would double, too, and therefore the return from pricing the dierence would increase... however, the
costs of policing would also increase, ... [since] people would gain more from stealing the dierence, by buying tickets
from the low-priced seats, for instance, and then attempting to occupy the higher priced ones."(Barzel 1989, p. 67).
What the present model suggests is that the theater's managers could always replicate the previous price dierences
either by reducing the relative value of the better seats (making them less comfortable) or by reducing the value of
all seats (hiring less famous actors).
17
costs are prohibitive?" (Cheung 1970, p. 58) The role played by the rst part of the answer, legal
institutions, is now well recognized. The English enclosure movement of the eighteenth century,
attributed mostly to a parliamentary statute which substantially reduced the xed costs associated
with enclosure, is a well known case (McCloskey 1975). By contrast, similar attempts at privatiz-
ing the commons in Old Regime France met little success due to high litigation costs which are
attributed to the lack of support from a central authority (Rosenthal 1992). But in this paper, the
set of legal institutions was assumed constant in order to consider the second part of the answer
to Cheung's question i.e., the role played by policing costs. To this end, I proposed a framework
from which to address the problem of natural resource exploitation when private ownership calls
for costly enforcement activities.
Enforcement costs were endogenized by explicitely describing individuals' incentives to encroach
on a resource site. It was shown that the equilibrium level of exploitation chosen by the owner
exceeds that for which the value of marginal product of labor equals the wage rate. This is so,
even though no encroachment occurs in equilibrium. At rst sight, it may thus seem that the
owner of a site overexploits her resources. However, when the endogenous enforcement costs are
accounted for, it becomes clear that this is not the case. The intuition is that an owner has
two ways of discouraging encroachers: she can either raise the probability of detection with larger
enforcement expenditures, or she can reduce the returns from encroaching by increasing the intensity
of exploitation, thus lowering labor's value of average product on the site. In equilibrium, the owner
will use a combination of both.
It was also shown that for reasonable functional forms, reductions in the wage rate may actually
result in lower equilibrium prots. This is explained by the fact that when the legal wage rate of
an economy is already quite low, further reductions so severely foster incentives to encroach that
increased enforcement costs outpace any additional direct prot from exploitation. Moreover, there
exists a threshold level of the legal wage rate below which positive prots become impossible to
achieve, with the result that the site is left to free access. Although these results were obtained with
specic functional forms, they did not require unreasonable assumptions about utility, detection,
18
or production functions.
Considering that wages are usually lower in less developed economies, the analysis provides a
formalized explanation as to why their property rights on natural resource sites are not so well
delineated as in industrialized economies. In some circumstances, the delineation of property rights
may be viewed as a response of agents to endogenous economic variables rather than a response to
dierent institutions. In this respect, some policy prescriptions that foster private ownership in less
developed countries in order to replicate their industrialized counterparts may end up being more
costly than benecial. Moreover, the distribution of a title to a previously unclaimed resource site
may not prevent it from being exploited as a free access resource.
Allowing tenure arrangements to depend on the wage rate brings up the following question: Is a
better delineation of property rights a prerequisite to economic growth or is it the other way around?
The foregoing analysis suggests that they go hand in hand. Economic growth, when associated with
an increase in wages, will reduce the pressure from encroachers and thus lead to a better delineation
of property rights. The ensuing gain in eciency in the exploitation of natural resources should
promote growth further. How this works out exactly will require a general equilibrium analysis and
goes beyond the scope of this study.
A second line of research which is suggested by the above analysis has to do with the distribution
of wealth. It was assumed, all along, that workers' income originated solely from their work wages.
There may be a case, here, for a Pareto improvement resulting from a better distribution of property
ownership between site owners and workers. By claiming a share of the rents from resource sites,
workers' income will increase, thereby reducing enforcement costs for the exploitation of the sites.
For the owners, the gains from reductions in enforcement costs may outweigh the foresaken shares
of the rents.
21
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An interesting study which tends to support this benecial eect resulting from a better distribution of wealth
is that of Johnsen (1986). The author argues that the Southern Kwakiutl Amerindians of the Canadian West Coast,
whose wealth dependent mostly on salmon, made use of a custom called the Potlatch system as a way to reduce
incentives for members of one group to encroach upon another's salmon shery. The Potlatch consisted of a ceremony
where gifts of signicant value were exchanged, thus amounting to a redistribution of income. A Potlatch host gained
social status proportional to his generosity. As the author notes, the system could only function because salmon
19
Another aspect which has been eschewed is the optimality of private decisions to enclose resource
sites and the optimal amount of government support. One would think that the government could
make it easier for owners to exclude encroachers, but at what cost? What is the nature of the
government's intervention? Is it a substitute or a complement to an owner's enforcement activities?
Finally, the model proposes a framework from which to study the eects of international trade
on natural resource exploitation, assuming that tenure arrangements are endogenously determined.
The model could be adapted to study the eects of international trade on the environment in a
similar framework.
being shed in rivers, the territories were relatively easy to protect from encroachment; this was not the case for
Amerindians of the interior who dependent mostly on bualo and antelope, which dwelt over large open areas.
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APPENDIX
A The determination of L

In the rst part of this appendix, it is shown that L

is a local maximum. It is subsequently shown
that L

is also a global maximum.
If we multiply through the rst-order condition (18) by A , BL

and rearrange, we get the
second degree polynomial:
2pB
2
L
2
,B(3pA, w)L

+ [B +A(pA, w)] = 0: (22)
Its roots are given by
L

1;2
=
1
4pB
h
(3pA, w) 
p
(3pA ,w)
2
, 8p[B +A(pA, w)]
i
; (23)
where L

1
and L

2
respectively denote the smallest and largest roots. The condition for a real value
of L

is:
(3pA, w)
2
 8p[B + A(pA, w)]: (24)
Note that the R.H.S. of this inequality must be positive since it is assumed that w  pA; otherwise
positive prots would be impossible to achieve, even in the absence of enforcement costs. Rear-
ranging the inequality, we get: (pA+w)
2
 8pB. We will assume throughout that (pA)
2
> 8pB,
i.e.
pA > 8
B
A
: (25)
In order for L

1
to be a local maximum, it is necessary to show that the second derivative of the
prot function is negative at L

1
. The direct way to do this is to insert the value of L

1
into the
second derivative of (L), and verify its sign. But since this leads to a very complex expression, we
will proceed indirectly as follows.
We know that (L) and 
0
(L) are continuous and nite over the interval 0  L < A=B.
Therefore, since L

1;2
> 0 because
p
(3pA, w)
2
, 8p[ B +A(pA, w)] < 3pA , w, the slope of
the prot function changes sign at most twice for L > 0. From Equations (19) and (23), we note
that 0 < L

1
< (3pA,w)=4pB < L

2
. As a result, it suces to show, for the second derivative to be
negative at L

1
, that [@=@L]
L=0
> 0 and [@=@L]
L=(3pA w)=4pB
< 0. The rst expression is
@
@L




L=0
= pA, w +
B
A
; (26)
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which is positive since pA > w. The second expression is
@
@L




L=
3pA w
4pB
= p

A, 2B

3pA, w
4pB

, w +
 B
A,B

3pA w
4pB

: (27)
The R.H.S. will be negative if assumption (25) holds. This completes the proof that L

is a local
maximum.
In order to show that L

is also a global maximum, let us proceed with a proof by contradiction.
Suppose that there exists an L
0
such that (L
0
) > (L

1
). Since @=@L > 0 for 0 < L < L

1
, we
must have L
0
> L

1
.
Choose L
0
such that V AP (L
0
) = w. We have (L
0
) = 0 since both enforcement costs and
prots are zero. If (L

1
) > 0, we must have L
0
> L

1
, since V AP (L

1
) > w and @V AP=@L < 0.
For L > L

1
, 
0
(L) can change sign only once at L

2
. Combining this with the fact that at
(L
0
) = 0, we have L
0
> L

1
, we get L
0
> L
0
. But then V AP (L
0
) < w, implying (L
0
) < 0 < (L

1
).
A contradiction. This completes the proof that (L

1
) is a global maximum.
B Equilibrium prots and wage levels
This appendix describes how the curve relating equilibriumprots on a resource site to the prevailing
wage rate has been derived. Its construction will proceed in four parts. These four parts provide
sucient information to draw 

(w) as illustrated in Figure 2. Together, parts 1, 2 and 4 explain
the portion of curve 

(w) between w and w
H
. Parts 1 and 3 explain the portion between 0 and
w. Part 5 is used to show that 

(w) is continuous and smooth between w
L
and w
H
.
1. At w = 2B=A, we have @

( w)=@w = 0, 

( w) > 0 and @
2


( w)=@w
2
< 0.
2. There exists w
H
, w < w
H
< pA, such that 

(w
H
) = 0 and @

(w
H
)=@w = 0.
3. @

=@w > 0 for w 2 (0; w) and lim
w!0


= ,1. This implies the existence of w
L
2 (0; w)
such that 

(w
L
) = 0.
4. @

=@w < 0 for w 2 ( w;w
H
).
5. 

(w) is continuous and smooth between w
L
and w
H
.
B.1
@

@w




w
= 0
22
Proof: From (20), we have @

=@w = 0 , L

= =w. Let w = w  2B=A and insert into
(19) to get L

= A=2B = = w. QED
@
2


@w
2




w
< 0
Proof: From (20), we have
@
2


@w
2
= ,
@L

@w
,

w
2
: (28)
Multiplying Equation (18) through by A,BL

, we get the implicit derivative:
@L

@w
=
A,BL

B(4pBL

)
h
L

,
3pA w
4pB
i
: (29)
Using the fact that at w = 2B=A we have L

= A=2B, we get:
@
2


@w
2




w
=
L

pA, w
,
L

w
:
Therefore, @
2


=@w
2
< 0 at w i pA > 2 w = 4B=A, which we have assumed to hold at (25).
QED


( w) > 0
Proof: Inserting w = 2B=A and L

= A=2B into the prot function (17), we get:


( w) =
pA
4B=A
, 

1 + ln

pA
4B=A

:
This implies


( w) > 0,
pA
2 w
> 1 + ln

pA
2 w

:
This last inequality holds for pA > 8B=A. QED
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B.2


(w
H
) = 0; for w
H
2 [ w; pA)
Proof: We will show that at w
H
, we have V AP (L

H
) = w
H
; this implies zero enforcement costs
and zero prots.
If V AP (L

H
) = w
H
, then L

H
= (pA,w
H
)=pB. Substituting into the rst-order condition (18),
we get
w
2
H
, pAw
H
+ pB = 0; (30)
or equivalently,w
H 1;2
= [pA
p
p
2
A
2
, 4pB]=2. In order for L

H
to be a maximumat w
H
, Equation
(19) indicates that we need L

H
= (pA,w
H
)=pB < (3pA,w
H
)=4pB, or equivalently, w
H
> pA=3.
Since we have assumed that pA > 8B=A, this implies
w < w
H
=
pA+
p
(pA)
2
, 4pB
2
< pA:
L

H
satises the prot maximizing rst-order condition at w
H
< pA and V AP (L

H
) = w
H
. QED
@

(w
H
)
@w
= 0
Proof: Substitute L

H
= (pA , w
H
)=pB into Equation (20) to get @

(w
H
)=@w = ,(pA ,
w
H
)=pB + =w
H
. Suppose that @

(w
H
)=@w 6= 0. Then, from the previous equation, we get
w
2
H
, pAw
H
+ pB 6= 0. This contradicts Equation (30). QED
B.3
@

@w




0<w< w
> 0
Proof: From Equation (20), we have @

=@w > 0 , L

< =w. Substituting into Equation
(19) and rearranging, this implies:
w(3pA , w), 4pB
| {z }
F (w)
< w
p
(3pA, w)
2
, 8p[B +A(pA, w)]
| {z }
G(w)
(31)
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We need to show that G(w) > F (w) for w 2 (0; w). First, we note that G(w) > 0 for w > 0.
F (w) is a polynomial of degree two with F
0
(w) = 3pA , 2w > 0 for w < pA. Its roots are
w
1;2
= [3pA 
p
9(pA)
2
, 16pB]=2. Since we have assumed that pA > 8B=A, it is easy to
show that w
1
2 (0; w) and w
2
> w
H
. Since w < pA, this implies F (w)  0 for w  w
1
=
[3pA,
p
9(pA)
2
, 16pB]=2. Therefore, F (w) < G(w) for w  w
1
.
It remains to show that F (w) < G(w) for w 2 (w
1
; w). Within that range, F (w)  0, hence
F (w) < G(w)) F
2
(w) < G
2
(w), i.e.
G
2
(w), F
2
(w) = Aw
3
, (2B + pA
2
)w
2
+ 3pABw , 2p(B)
2
 H(w) > 0: (32)
Suppose that H(w)  0 for some w 2 (w
1
; w). Since H(w
1
) > 0 and H( w) = 0, this implies that
there exists w

2 (w
1
; w) such that H(w

) = 0. Moreover, since H(w) is a polynomial of degree
three, H
0
(w) has at most two zeros. Therefore, H(w

) = H( w) = H(w
H
) = 0 where w

< w < w
H
implies that H
0
( w) > 0. Taking the derivative of H(w), substituting w = 2B=A and rearranging,
this implies H
0
( w) = 4(B)
2
=A , pAB > 0, or pA < 4B=A. This violates the assumption that
pA > 8B=A. Therefore, H(w) > 0 for w 2 (w
1
; w). QED
lim
w!0


(w) = ,1
Proof: Equilibrium prots can be expressed as:


(w) = [V AP (L

), w]L

,  ln
V AP (L

)
w
; (33)
where the rst term on the R.H.S. of the equality represents direct exploitation prots while the
second term represents enforcement costs. From Equation (19), we have lim
w!0
L

= [3pA ,
p
(pA)
2
, 8pB]=4pB < A=B. Therefore, 0 < lim
w!0
V AP (L

) < +1. This implies
lim
w!0
V AP (L

)=w = +1. Inserting these results into the the equilibrium prot function, we get
nite direct exploitation prots but innitely large enforcement costs as w approaches zero. QED
B.4
@

@w




w<w<w
H
< 0
Proof: We need to show that L

> =w for w 2 ( w;w
H
). Let us borrow from the expressions
dened in Equations (31) and (32). It was shown that F (w) > 0 for w 2 ( w;w
H
). Therefore,
H(w) < 0, L

> =w for w 2 ( w;w
H
).
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Suppose that H(w) > 0 for some w
0
2 ( w;w
H
). Since H
0
(w) has at most two zeros, and
H(w) > 0 for w 2 (0; w) andH
0
( w) < 0, then H
0
(w
H
) < 0. But H
0
(w
H
) = (A=2)(pA,4B=A)[pA+
p
(pA)
2
, 4pB] > 0 since pA > 8B=A by assumption. A contradiction. Therefore, H(w) < 0 for
w 2 ( w;w
H
). QED
B.5
Demonstration that 

(w) is continous and smooth over the interval (0; w
H
]:
From (19), L

(w) is continous and nite for w 2 (0; w
H
]. This implies that V AP (L

(w)) =
p(A ,BL

(w)) is continous and nite over the interval (0; w
H
]. Hence, 

(L

(w); w) is continous
over (0; w
H
]. From (29), we have @L

=@w < 0. Since lim
w!0
L

< A=B, @

=@w, as dened by
(20), is continous and nite over (0; w
H
]. This completes the demonstration.
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